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TIPPING THE SCALE: IS THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
INTERNATIONAL ENOUGH TO OVERRIDE STATE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY?
Heather Noël Ludwig*
The political environment in Lebanon is one plagued with a tumultuous history of violence and power struggles. This turmoil climaxed on
February 14, 2005, when the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, was assassinated in a terrorist attack. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon
was subsequently created by the U.N. Security Council to try those responsible for Hariri’s assassination. Previous international U.N.-created tribunals have successfully eliminated head of state immunity protections of
the accused. However, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s unique characteristics prompt a weighty legal question, one who’s positive answer is vital
for the Tribunal’s existence, especially if it is found that those responsible
for the attack appear to be high-ranking state officials: Is the Special Tribunal for Lebanon “international” enough to eliminate head of state immunity claims?
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I. INTRODUCTION
After the assassination of Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in
Lebanon, the United Nations, at the request of the Lebanese government,
did something it had never done before. It created a tribunal to try a possible
event of ―terrorism.‖1 The validity of this judicial body as an ―international‖
tribunal is highly debated, specifically because in contrast to other international U.N.-created tribunals before it, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(STL) (1) will only try cases of terrorism and terrorism-related offenses; (2)
has a subject matter jurisdiction framed only with references to domestic

1

The concept of creating an international definition for the crime of terrorism is addressed infra Part III.C.6
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law; and (3) has a statute that does not explicitly eliminate state official immunity.2
The counsel of the accused before the STL may claim the tribunal is
not a legitimate ―international‖ court. If the Chambers of the STL concludes
that the court is not an ―international‖ tribunal, the STL prosecution may be
unable to eliminate any high-ranking state immunity protections of the accused. Without circumventing immunity protections, the success of the STL
to try those responsible for the Hariri assassination and related attacks may
be in jeopardy. However, both the characteristics the STL shares with other
ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals and the international trend to define terrorist
acts as the most egregious crimes in the world aids in tipping the scale to
favor the STL being categorized as ―international.‖ This categorization of
―international‖ will equip the court with the ability to eliminate any state
official immunity protections of the accused. More importantly, it will redefine the scope of crimes that future U.N.-created tribunals will be permitted
to try, as well as the scope of the sovereign rights nations possess with respect to trying crimes of terrorism.
This Note begins by exploring the background and legal history surrounding the creation of the STL in Part II. Part III provides a legal analysis
that evaluates the factors used in determining if the STL is an ―international‖ court, including: (1) the authority vested to the court; (2) the characteristics of the court; and (3) the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. A visual
comparison of the characteristics analysis completed in Part III is appended
to the note in Annex 1 for reader reference. Finally, this Note examines how
the crimes being tried before the STL affect the ability of both the STL and
future U.N.-created tribunals in trying crimes of ―terrorism.‖ Specifically, it
answers the question whether crimes of ―terrorism‖ can be considered ―international‖ enough for courts to eliminate high-ranking state official immunities.
II. THE BACKGROUND AND LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR
LEBANON
A.

The Historical Development of International Criminal Tribunals

The creation of international tribunals to try criminals for crimes so
heinous that they offend the conscience of humankind began after World
War II when a group of ambitious lawyers, along with the aid of the Allied
Powers, tried Nazis at the International Military Tribunals at Nuremburg.3
2

See Melia Amal Bouhabib, Power and Perception: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 3
BERK. J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 173, 191–95 (2009).
3
See Lindsey Raub, Note, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 1013, 1013–14 (2009).
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The Nuremburg trials established that individuals have duties under international law, and that responsibility will attach to individuals when they
commit such heinous crimes.4 The international legal environment continued to evolve since the Nuremburg trials, and eighteen years ago, the first
U.N.-based international criminal tribunal was created.5 Today, U.N.-hybrid
and ad-hoc courts prosecute, as well as sentence, criminals from a variety of
different countries.6 The international community continually faces new
challenges in upholding justice and defining global norms of responsibility.
These new challenges require the creation of innovative types of U.N.tribunals. One tribunal addressing a subject matter never employed by previous UN-created courts is the STL.
―International‖ crimes, also referred to as stricto senso crimes, fall
within the subject matter jurisdiction of all international U.N.-created tribunals except the STL.7 In general, stricto senso crimes are forms of conduct so egregious that those who engage in the acts are considered ―enemies
of all mankind.‖ Accordingly, all nations of the world have an interest in
ensuring the responsible individuals are prosecuted.8 The idea that certain
crimes are ―international‖ stems back to the Nuremberg trials when Justice
Jackson explained the authority to try certain crimes existed because, ―those
acts which offended the conscience of our people . . . [were] criminal by
standards generally accepted in all civilized countries.‖9 Jackson relied on
historic precedent from The Hague Conventions of 1907, the KelloggBriand pact of 1928, and the Geneva Protocol of 1924 to define the scope of
stricto senso crimes.10 Since Nuremberg, several other tribunals have voiced
opinions about the power of tribunals both national and international to try
international stricto senso crimes.
4

Id.
Larry D. Johnson, Lecture, UN-Based International Criminal Tribunals: How They Mix
and Match, 36 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 275, 276 (2008).
6
Id. (countries include the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and
Lebanon).
7
See Cécile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5
J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 1107, 1107–08, 1111 (2007); see also infra Part III.C.6.b for a further
discussion of international stricto senso crimes.
8
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH L. REV. 2129, 2133–34 (1999).
9
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN, Report of Robert H. Jackson to the President on Atrocities and War Crimes (June 7, 1945), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt_jack
01.asp.
10
See MICHAEL P. SCHARF & MICHAEL A. NEWTON, Terrorism and Crimes Against Humanity, in LEILA SADAT, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (forthcoming) (discussing prosecuting
war crimes as a part of the ―laws of humanity‖ in the Hague Conventions, renouncing war in
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and declaring wars of aggression as international crimes in the
Geneva Protocol).
5
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Stricto senso international crimes include genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity.11 In contrast, the STL may only try cases of crimes
of ―terrorism,‖ offenses against life and personal integrity, illicit associations, and failure to report crimes and offenses that stem from the car bombing of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hirari and twenty-two others.12 Additionally, the explicit subject matter jurisdiction of the STL statute encompasses only Lebanese domestic law.13 While the statues of other U.N.created tribunals provide for jurisdiction over a mix of international and
domestic crimes, none outside the STL has ever tried only domestically
defined crimes.14 Finally, the STL‘s statute does not explicitly eliminate
state official immunity, while the statutes of other U.N.-created tribunals
before it explicitly eliminate immunity protections.15 Combined, these issues may cause significant problems for the court if those responsible for
the Hariri attack appear to be high-ranking state officials, who would normally have official immunity from prosecution in a national court.16 The
aforementioned divergences between the STL and traditional international
courts provoke heated debate in the international legal community about
which factors are required for a court to be considered ―international‖
enough to remove the immunity of an accused state official.
B.

The History of the Creation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Two years after the Hariri attack, Lebanon signed an agreement
with the United Nations to create the STL.17 The tribunal will try individuals deemed responsible for the attack and for subsequent related events,
which occurred between October 1, 2004, and December 12, 2005, and resembled the Hariri Attack in manner and purpose.18 The Lebanese Parliament failed to ratify the agreement for the tribunal by June 10, 2007,
through its domestic legislative process.19 However, the Security Council
11

Id.
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757
(May 30, 2007).The STL may try these crimes as they are defined under the Lebanese Criminal Code.
13
Id. art. 2.
14
Aptel, supra note 7, at 1107–08, 1111.
15
Id. at 1110.
16
See generally Bouhabib, supra note 2.
17
See generally id. (The STL was created by Security Council Resolution 1757 on May
30, 2007, and the agreement between Lebanon and the United Nations is annexed to Resolution 1757); see also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon supra, note 12.
18
Bouhabib, supra note 2, at 12; see also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
supra note 12.
19
U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1757 (2007) of 30 May 2007, U.N. Doc. S/2007/525 (Sept. 4, 2007).
12
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desired to establish the tribunal immediately. Accordingly, the Security
Council disregarded the Lebanese legislative stalemate and authorized the
formation of the tribunal under its Chapter VII powers, with a vote of ten
members approving and five abstaining.20
The United Nations also initiated a fact-finding mission to investigate the attacks and the adequacy of the subsequent investigation by Lebanese authorities. The Security Council welcomed the commission‘s report,
which stated that there was probable cause that high-ranking state officials
were involved in the Hariri assassination especially considering the complexity of the attacks.21
Although no indictment has been made public yet,22 the involvement of high-ranking state officials, if any, would potentially lead to several
future claims of state official immunity before the STL. If the claims for
immunity are recognized, the tribunal would be prevented from prosecuting
any high-ranking state officials involved with the attacks.23 On the other
hand, if it is determined that the STL is an ―international‖ court, immunity
claims of the accused will be circumvented.24 The complexity of this issue
is compounded by the several attributes of the STL that are unique from any
other U.N.-created court.25 As previously mentioned in this Note, these
20

Id; see also U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5685th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5685 (May 30,
2007).
21
S.C. Res. 1636, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1636 (June 31, 2005) (responding to the report of the
United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (S/2005/662) concerning its investigation into the February 14, 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, that
killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, and caused injury to dozens of people).
22
Press Release, Radhia Achouri, Special Tribunal for Lebanon Office of the Prosecutor,
The Office of the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Responds to Speculations
on its Work, Special Tribunal for Lebanon Press Release No.2010/003 (Mar. 26, 2010),
available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/sid/183 (stating that any information regarding the indictment reported by individuals other than the Prosecutor or his Official Spokesperson is solely
speculation); see also Arthur Blok, Exclusive to NOW Lebanon: Bellemare: No Indictment in
September (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=198
004 (In this interview, Bellamare asserted that he is the only one who knows about the information on the indictment. He also referred to claims made by media sources regarding the
indictment as ―outrageous‖ and stated that unless, ―they can read into my brain, everything
else is just speculation.‖).
23
William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 LEIDEN J. INT‘L L.
513, 527 (2008).
24
Id.
25
See generally id. at 514 (looking to the subtopic‘s of Schabas‘s article for direction on
factors used in determining if a court is ―international‖); see also INT‘L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROSECUTIONS PROGRAM, HANDBOOK ON THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR
LEBANON 9–31 (2008), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/9/1/914.pdf (comparing and contrasting the STL to other international ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals, and displaying
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attributes include the STL being the first tribunal of international character
that: (1) will hear solely cases of crimes of terrorism and terrorism-related
offenses; (2) has subject matter jurisdiction framed only with references to
domestic law; and (3) has a statute that does not eliminate state official immunity, a provision that was included in the statutes of all other U.N.created tribunals before it.26 Limiting the subject matter jurisdiction of STL
the will play a major role in defining the tribunal. It will either contribute to
its downfall or will allow the STL to blaze a groundbreaking legal path by
redefining the current doctrine of international criminal law, specifically
concerning international crimes of ―terrorism.‖
To determine if the STL is an international tribunal, a comparison
must be completed of the STL and previous international U.N.-created tribunals. The individual attributes of each U.N.-created tribunal are first individually analyzed in a legal context. A visual comparative representation of
the STL, previous U.N.-created hybrid and ad-hoc tribunals, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) is appended in an Annex to this Note for ease
of comparison.27 This Note will then evaluate if the subject matter jurisdiction of the STL, the Hariri assassination, and related attacks are acts of terrorism so egregious that they may be considered crimes against humanity.
Specifically, this Note focuses on how this categorization of the attacks may
further tip the scale in favor the STL being international enough to eliminate
head of state immunity protection.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Defining an “International” Court

The Nuremburg Tribunal first explained that restrictive immunity is
required for individuals being tried for stricto senso crimes before an international court.28 Additionally, the Tribunal established that high-ranking
state official immunity claims must be eliminated for all international
courts.29 This groundbreaking international court stated that ―[c]rimes
that there exists a strong precedent in international law for eliminating immunity claims
when the accused individuals are being tried before international courts).
26
Schabas, supra note 23 at 524–27. The author disagrees with Schabas and argues that
provisions eliminating state official immunity and withdraw of the defense of official capacity are different concepts, specifically because both provisions protect high ranking officials
from possible prosecution before the court as Schabas pointed out occurred in the Yeroida
(Arrest Warrant Case - ICJ), Milosevic (ICTY), and Taylor (SCSL) cases (noting that some
tribunals including the ICTY and SCSL have provisions eliminating the ―official‖ defense.).
27
See app. 1.
28
International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) Judgment and Sentences, as reprinted in
41 AM. J. INT‘L L. 172, 221 (1946).
29
Id.
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against international law are committed by men, and not by abstract entities,
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.‖30
More recently, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) echoed the
Nuremburg sentiment in the Arrest Warrant case when it stated that although courts of a third state are barred from trying heads of state, ―certain
international criminal courts‖ can try high-ranking state officials if the international courts have jurisdiction.31 The Arrest Warrant court did not define the criteria required for identifying ―international courts,‖ but distinguished international courts from courts of ―foreign jurisdiction‖ or of ―one
state.‖32 Additionally, the court listed examples of international courts including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the future ICC. 33 The examples enumerated by the court in Arrest Warrant case are all U.N.-created
tribunals, and like the STL, were formed under the Security Council‘s
Chapter VII powers.34
The Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) is a further example of a
U.N.-created tribunal capable of eliminating high-ranking state official immunity claims. Specifically, the SCSL removed immunity protections from
Liberia‘s former President in Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor.35 The SCSL
supported its decision to remove Charles Taylor‘s (Taylor) immunities by
30

Id.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Belgium) [hereinafter
Arrest Warrant], Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Rep. 3 para. 61 (2002) (citing throughout how a Brussels court issued an arrest warrant for the incumbent minister of foreign affairs of Congo, Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (hereinafter Yerodia) for crimes against humanity and other crimes under international law that violated the 1949 Geneva Conventions for
allegedly inciting the massacre of a Tutsi ethnic group in Kinshasa. The Democratic Republic of Congo claimed that immunity protections for Yerodia must be upheld because he was a
current Minister of Foreign Affairs. The International Court of Justice enumerated positions
that receive immunity protections including; Diplomats, Heads of State, Heads of Government, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Holding, in a final binding decision that the international circulation of an arrest warrant by Belgium violated the foreign minister‘s personal
immunity from criminal prosecutions. Restricting the scope of immunity from criminal jurisdiction for an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs on the basis of international customary
law.); See also Schabas, supra note 23, at 514.
32
Arrest Warrant, supra note 31; see also Arrest Warrant, Judgment of 14 February 2002
(2001) (After defining the scope of immunities afforded to current high-ranking state officials, the court enumerated the exceptions to claims of immunity for both current and former
high-ranking officials, including powers afforded to ―certain international criminal courts.‖).
33
Id. (stating that these courts do have jurisdiction over individuals from a third party
state).
34
Id. para. 61.
35
Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, para. 53 (May 31, 2004) [hereinafter Taylor].
31
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relying on the tribunal‘s status as an ―international court.‖36 In the case,
Taylor, the former President of Liberia, was indicted for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of both national and international law, including acts of terrorism.37 Taylor challenged the validity of
his indictment, claiming the charges were issued while he was still in office,
and that the indictment was contrary to the immunity afforded to a head of
state under international law.38 The SCSL rejected his argument based on
the Statutes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals;
the approach and authority vested in ad-hoc international criminal courts;
the approach to immunity protections taken by the ICC; and the holdings in
the Arrest Warrant and Pinochet cases.39 The SCSL chambers stated—
concerning the immunities afforded to high-ranking officials—that ―the
principle seems now established that the sovereign equality of states does
not prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an international
criminal tribunal or court.‖40
While strong authority exists for denying the immunity claims of
individuals being tried before U.N.-created ―international‖ courts, no bright
line rule for defining ―international‖ courts currently exists. A survey of
relevant case law reveals there are several factors courts balance to determine if a court is ―international‖ enough to eliminate head of state immunities: (1) the authority vested to the court; (2) the characteristics of the court;
and (3) the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.41 The STL‘s attributes
that are distinctive from other U.N.-created tribunals create a challenging
36

Id. para. 54.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Indictment, paras. 32–59 (March 7, 2003) (Count
one of the indictment charged Mr. Taylor with Acts of Terrorism in violation of article 3
Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, allowing him to be punished under Article 3.d of the SCSL Statute.).
38
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, paras. 1–8 (May 21, 2004).
39
Id. paras. 34–60; see also generally Arrest Warrant, supra note 31 (describing facts and
holding of case); see also generally Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet,
[1999] 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L.) (Authorities issued an international arrest warrant to apprehend
the former head of state of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, for allegations of torture during his time
as Chile‘s head of state. United Kingdom (UK) officials arrested Pinochet while he was
visiting the UK and Spain then requested his extradition. The Law Lords determined that
customarily a former head of state such as Pinochet would be afforded immunity for acts of
torture, however the court did not grant him immunity because Chile had ratified the Torture
Convention of 1988 and consequently waived head of state immunity protections for acts of
torture.).
40
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, para. 52 (May 31, 2004).
41
See generally Schabas, supra note 23 (looking to the subtopic‘s of Schabas‘s article for
direction on factors); See also generally INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note
25 (comparing and contrasting the STL to other international ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals
throughout the handbook leading to several evaluative factors that are similar to those Schabas points out in his article).
37
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task for those attempting to determine if the STL is international enough to
eliminate high-ranking official immunities.42 Each of the factors used to
determine the level of a court‘s ―international‖ character, as well as the
presence of these factors in the STL, will be addressed, beginning with the
level of authority vested to a tribunal.
B.

Level of Authority Vested by the International Community to the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The level of authority vested to a tribunal is determined by evaluating (1) the specific mode of establishment used to create the court; (2) the
explicit powers granted to the court through its statute; (3) the level of support expressed by the Security Council during the court‘s creation; and (4)
the general evolution of tribunal at the United Nations during its establishment. When examining these factors in relation to the STL, it becomes apparent that the STL has a level of vested authority similar in scope to other
U.N.-established international tribunals.
1.

Mode of establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The mode of establishment used to create a court is one factor
weighed when determining if the STL is a legitimate international court,
and if the level of authority vested in the court mirrors the level afforded to
other international courts by the international community.43 The STL was
created through Security Council Resolution 1757 (Resolution 1757), which
enacted an agreement negotiated between the United Nations and the Lebanese government. Resolution 1757 was adopted under the Security Council‘s Chapter VII enforcement powers.44 This mode of establishment is
unique from the methods used to form other ad-hoc and hybrid international
tribunals, because it integrates two traditional methods of establishment.45
The forms of establishment for previous U.N.-created international tribunals
include (1) a Security Council Resolution passed under Chapter VII ―peacekeeping‖ enforcement powers; (2) an agreement to establish the tribunal
between the United Nations and the nation the tribunal is created for; and
(3) a multilateral treaty.46

42
See supra Part II.B. (referring to the STL as the first United Nations endorsed tribunal
that: (1) will hear solely cases of crimes of terrorism and terrorism-related offenses, (2) with
subject matter jurisdiction framed only with references to domestic law; and (3) who‘s statute does not eliminate state official immunity like other U.N.-created tribunals before it.).
43
Johnson, supra note 5, at 276–77.
44
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12.
45
Johnson, supra note 5, at 276–77.
46
Id.
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Through a Security Council Resolution, states may choose to bring
alleged perpetrators of international crimes before an international tribunal
instead of a national court.47 The Security Council represented the will of
the international community and established two U.N.-backed ad-hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), under its
Chapter VII peacekeeping enforcement powers.48 Establishing a tribunal
through a Security Council Resolution under the Council‘s Chapter VII
peacekeeping enforcement powers is a valid method of creating an international court.49 The option to bring perpetrators of crimes of international law
before a U.N.-sponsored tribunal is recognized in Article VI of the Genocide Convention, the commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and
throughout the Nuremburg Judgment.50
Alternatively, a tribunal may be created through a bilateral treaty
between the United Nations and the tribunals‘ respective countries. Two
U.N.-backed hybrid tribunals, the SCSL and Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), were established by a bilateral agreement.
The SCSL was established when Sierra Leone signed a treaty with the Security Council.51 The ECCC was created through a treaty between Cambodia
and the U.N. General Assembly.52 These tribunals were not imposed on the
countries concerned like the ITCY and ITCR were with Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, respectively. Instead, they were created with the consent and at the
request of each nation.53 In contrast, the STL was created when the Security
Council through its Chapter VII peacekeeping enforcement powers unilate-

47

Id.
Id.
49
See VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 82,87–88 (Transnational Publishers Inc. New York, NY 1998) (this
peacekeeping power is consistent with the powers granted to the Security Council through
the United Nations Charter).
50
VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER‘S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 37 (Transnational Publishers Inc. New
York, NY 1995).
51
See generally Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (Jan. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CLk1rMQtCHg%3D&tabid=176.
52
See generally Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (June, 6 2003), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/
english/agreement_image.aspx.
53
Johnson, supra note 5, at 277.
48
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rally passed an agreement it had formed earlier with Lebanon. 54 To date,
Lebanon has not ratified the agreement for the STL.55
Critics claim this unique method of creating a U.N.-backed tribunal
may not be valid, and that the Security Council overstepped its powers. Especially if the Security Council considered the method of creation for the
STL to be a treaty forcibly passed through its ―peacekeeping‖ powers.56
Additionally, critics assert that because the Lebanese Parliament has yet to
ratify the STL agreement, the tribunal is unconstitutional and not endorsed
by the Lebanese population.57 In November 2006, the United Nations Legal
Counsel, Nicolas Michel, addressed this issue, telling the Security Council:
[T]he Lebanese constitutional process for the conclusion of an agreement
with the United Nations has not been completed. Major steps remain to be
taken, in particular formal approval by the Government, which is the prerequisite for the signature of the treaty and its submission for parliamentary approval and, ultimately, its ratification.58

Regardless of this difficulty, like the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC, and the
SCSL before it, the STL was created after careful consideration of the various options for establishment .59 The Security Council was forced to create
the STL unilaterally using its Chapter VII powers because of the Lebanese
legislative stalemate. It likely did not intend to bring the agreement into
force as an international treaty binding Lebanon, but instead implemented
Lebanon‘s request to create a tribunal.60 Prime Minister Fouad Siniora first

54

Id.; see also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12.
PressTV, ‗Justice, Main victim in Hariri tribunal‘ (Thursday January 13, 2011 9:38AM)
(this article is a transcript of Press TV‘s interview with Daoud Khairallah, Georgetown University professor of law), available at http://www.presstv.ir/detail/159941.html.
56
See Bardo Fassbender, Reflections on the International Legality of the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, 5 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 1091, 1093 (2007) (discussing the necessity of a country‘s formal parliamentary approval of an agreement in order for ratification to be valid); see
also U.N. Charter ch. VII, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.
shtml (describing the peacekeeping powers of the Security Council).
57
See Fassbender, supra note 56, at 1091–1104 (discussing how the Security Council
intended to create a treaty by entering into force the U.N.-Lebanese annexed agreement to
Resolution 1757, which created a court to try the Hariri assassination, and that this treaty is
not valid because the Lebanese Parliament never actually ratified the agreement).
58
U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Addendum, U.N. Doc. S/2006/893/Add.1 (Nov. 21, 2006).
59
MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 49, at 79–82, 88–89 (discussing the Security Council‘s
consideration of the disadvantages of each method of establishment when creating a tribunal).
60
See Fassbender, supra note 56, at 1097–1100 (arguing that this is the only legally permissible method to create a tribunal when the events leading up to the creation of the STL
are taken into consideration).
55
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approached the United Nations and requested that a tribunal be created.61
Lebanon has not yet accepted the agreement for the STL through its constitutional process only because the Lebanese Parliament has not approved the
STL‘s plan.62 The lack of legislative approval is only due to the fact the
Lebanese Parliament speaker, Nabih Berri, refuses to convene the chamber
to address the tribunal‘s creation.63
In Taylor, the appeals chamber of the SCSL faced a similar scenario. The defense argued that a court formed through an agreement between
the Security Council and the Sierra Leone government was not a valid court,
specifically because it does not have the Chapter VII enforcement powers
that ad-hoc tribunals possess.64 However, the court held that the SCSL is
indeed an international court. In its decision, the Taylor Chambers explained that the one must look beyond the SCSL enforcement powers of a
court to determine if it is a valid international court. The Taylor Chambers
pointed to a courts mode of establishment as an additional factor when determining if a court is ―international.‖ Specifically, it named a previous
SCSL case referred to as the ―Decision on Constitutionality,‖ in which the
defense argued that although the Sierra Leone government ratified the
agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone for the SCSL, the
agreement was not approved by a popular referendum because no such referendum was held. The defense in the ―Decision on Constitutionality‖ case
claimed a lack of referendum support made the SCSL an unconstitutional
creation because approval by referendum is required for bringing a treaty
into force under the Sierra Leone Constitution.65 Ultimately, the ―Decision
on Constitutionality‖ court rejected the defense argument and held that a
referendum was not required to validate the SCSL because it was (1) an
international court established by a treaty between the United Nations and
61

Chargé d‘affaires a.i, Letter dated 13 Dec. 2005 from the Chargé d‘affaires a.i of the
Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the U.N. addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
S/2005/783 (Dec. 13, 2005).
62
See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorized Establishment of
Special Tribunal to Try Suspects in Assassination of Rafiq Hariri, U.N. Press Release
SC/9029 (May 30, 2007) (describing the Lebanon Parliament‘s efforts to convene and approve the tribunal).
63
See id.
64
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 6–8 (May 31, 2004) [hereinafter Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction].
65
See id. ¶ 34 (stating that the legal status of the Special Court is a main issue in the motion); see also Prosecutor v. Kallon, Norman & Kamara, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E),
Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 3, 8, 10, 15 (Mar. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Decision on Constitutionality] (arguing that the Government of Sierra Leone acted
unconstitutionally and had no lawful authority to enter into an agreement for the tribunal
because it failed to secure the ratification by popular referendum: a process required by the
country‘s constitution to bring a treaty into force).
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Sierra Leone outside of the Sierra Leone court system and is not part of the
Sierra Leone Judiciary,66 and (2) is distinctive from domestic courts because
the SCSL has powers that domestic courts do not possess.67
The Taylor Chambers added to the holding of the ―Decision on
Constitutionality‖ court and stated that an agreement to create the tribunal
between Sierra Leone and the United Nations was the equivalent of an
agreement between Sierra Leone and all members of the United Nations.68
Additionally, the creation of the binding United Nations agreement was a
representation of the overall will of the international community (including
Sierra Leone) to try the crimes committed in Sierra Leone at an international level.69 Under these lines of reasoning, the Taylor court defined the tribunal as a ―truly international.‖ 70 Like the SCSL, the STL was also created
by the United Nations at the request of a national government and an
agreement reflecting this request was created. However, unlike Sierra
Leone, the Lebanese government has not approved the creation of the tribunal through any portion of its legislative process.
Answering the arguments of critics cited above, it appears Lebanon
does not expressly disapprove of the STL. Although, Lebanese legislative
action regarding the STL has not yet taken place, the will of the Lebanese
people is unknown only because Nabih Berri is refusing to convene parliament, thereby purposefully freezing the political process.71 Additionally, the
Lebanese government was actively involved in creating the STL statute and
agreement.72 Adhering to Lebanon‘s requests, the Security Council adopted
the STL‘s Resolution under its Chapter VII Article 39 powers of ―promoting international peace and security.‖73 Lebanon has also since signed a
66
See Decision on Constitutionality, supra note 65, ¶¶ 42–43, 49, 52–53 (stating that the
Special Court is a treaty-based generis court of mixed jurisdiction and therefore not part of
Sierra Leone‘s judiciary).
67
See id. ¶ 50 (citing Article 11(d) of the Special Court Agreement which allows the Special Court to ―enter into agreements with States as may be necessary for the exercise of its
functions and for the operation of the Special Court.‖, allowing the Special Court to conclude
treaties, a power that is unavailable to the national Sierra Leone courts.).
68
See Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 64, ¶ 38 (―It is to be observed that in carrying out
its duties under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the
Security Council acts on behalf of the members of the United Nations.‖).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Marieke Wierda, Habib Nassar,& Lynn Maalouf, Early Reflections on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST.
1065, 1074 (2007).
72
See INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 9, 13–14 (discussing the
origins of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the events leading to Security Council Resolution 1757).
73
U.N. Charter art., supra note 56, art. 39.
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Memorandum of Understanding (―MOU‖) with the STL. The MOU promises cooperation between Office of the Prosecutor (―OTP‖) and the ―Lebanese Ministries, Lebanese juridical authorities and other official institutions,
as necessary,‖ and specifically guarantees that the Lebanese Government
will provide the OTP with all necessary assistance from Lebanon to fulfill
its mandate.74 These collaborative efforts between the United Nations and
Lebanon exemplify the Lebanese government‘s further support for the STL.
Additionally, the STL agreement uses the same language as the
SCSL agreement, which was cited by the ―Decision on Constitutionality‖
court, giving the STL powers that Lebanese courts do not possess. Specifically, the STL and SCSL agreements provide the tribunals the ability to
conclude treaties with States as needed for the function and operation of the
court.75 Like the SCSL, the STL was created by the United Nations, outside
of the Lebanese Judiciary system, at the request of a national government,
and has powers afforded to it unique from the national Lebanese courts. The
inability of the Lebanese government to ratify the agreement for the STL,
while unfortunate, does not affect its validity as a U.N.-created tribunal.
Although, the mode of establishment will not affect the legitimacy of the
STL, the documents created during its establishment will affect the enforcement powers the tribunal is afforded.
The agreement and statute for the STL obligate Lebanon to comply
with tribunal decisions. However, the documents are silent as to the tribunal‘s powers to require other states to comply with its orders and requests. 76
Formation of a tribunal through a bilateral treaty affords the court no enforcement powers for orders and requests outside of the states concerned
with the tribunals.77 In contrast, establishing a tribunal through a Security
Council-imposed resolution binds all United Nations member states to the
resolution, and requires nations to comply with the tribunal‘s orders under
the Security Council‘s Chapter VII enforcement powers. It also allows the
Security Council to impose sanctions on states that do not comply with a
tribunal request.78 The Security Council‘s Chapter VII enforcement powers
74
Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Modalities of Cooperation, Leb.-Off. of
the Prosecutor of the STL, SPECIAL TRIB. FOR LEB., available at http://www.stltsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/Cooperation/mou_otp-lebanon_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 17,
2011).
75
Decision on Constitutionality, supra note 65, ¶ 50; see also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 7 (specifically these courts may, ―enter into agreements with States as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and for the operation
of the Special Court.‖).
76
See INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 35–36; see also Statute of
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12.
77
See INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 37 (discussing the limitations of enforcement powers for ―hybrid‖ tribunals).
78
Id. at 35–36.
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on third party states apply to the entire tribunal resolution for the ICTY and
ICTR. This is reflected by the use of the word ―shall‖ before the listing of
the third party states obligations. For example, the ITCR statute states that
under the Security Council Chapter VII powers:
[A]ll States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take any measures
necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the
present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to
comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber
under Article 28 of the Statute, and requests States to keep the SecretaryGeneral informed of such measures.79

Alternatively, when evaluating the wording used in the STL statute,
it appears that Security Council Chapter VII enforcement powers apply only
to the paragraph that established the STL within Resolution 1757, and to the
paragraph that explains the Republic of Lebanon‘s compliance requirements
when presented with requests by the STL. The first paragraph, with the use
of the word shall, does not address the ability of the STL to require third
party states to comply with the court‘s decisions and requests. This paragraph states:
1. Decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
that:
(a) The provisions of the annexed document, including its attachment, on
the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon shall enter into force
on 10 June 2007, unless the Government of Lebanon has provided notification under Article (1) of the annexed document before that date;
(b) If the Secretary-General reports that the Headquarters Agreement has
not been concluded as envisioned under Article 8 of the annexed document, the location of the seat of the Tribunal shall be determined in consultation with the Government of Lebanon and be subject to the conclusion of a Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the
State that hosts the Tribunal;
(c) If the Secretary-General reports that contributions from the Government of Lebanon are not sufficient to bear the expenses described in Article 5 (b) of the annexed document, he may accept or use voluntary contributions from States to cover any shortfall.80

Following the above paragraph in the STL‘s Establishment Resolution, the Security Council attached the previously created agreement be79

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda para. 2, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (emphasis added).
80
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, at 2 (emphasis added).
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tween the Council and Lebanon. In the Establishment Resolution, the requirements for states to comply with the tribunals requests is discussed in
Article 15 which states:
1. The Government shall cooperate with all organs of the Special Tribunal, in particular with the Prosecutor and defense counsel, at all stages of
the proceedings. It shall facilitate access of the Prosecutor and defense
counsel to sites, persons and relevant documents required for the investigation.
2. The Government shall comply without undue delay with any request
for assistance by the Special Tribunal or an order issued by the Chambers,
including, but not limited to:
(a) Identification and location of persons;
(b) Service of documents;
(c) Arrest or detention of persons;
(d) Transfer of an indictee to the Tribunal.81

While the word shall is used, it is only used in reference to ―The
Government,‖ meaning Lebanon.82 The cooperation of third party states is
not addressed in the STL Agreement like it is in the agreements of the other
Security Council mandated tribunals. This seems to suggest that the language of the agreement only affords the Security Council‘s Chapter VII
enforcement powers to the establishment of the tribunal, requiring the
agreement for the STL be entered into force and with Lebanese cooperation,
nothing further.
Lack of enforcement powers may cause problems for the tribunal if
it needs a nation to extradite their high-ranking state officials so that they
may be tried before the tribunal. Lebanon is the only nation bound by Security Council Resolution 1757 that is required to co-operate completely with
requests of the STL.83 It is possible that third party states to the tribunal
might choose not to carry out the requests of the court. Accordingly, although the STL‘s mode of establishment vests authority to the court to do
away with high ranking official immunities, problems may still arise concerning completing arrests or achieving the surrenders of high ranking officials for trial.

81
82
83

Id. art. 15 (emphasis added).
See id. para. 4.
See id. art. 15.
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Presence of an explicit provision that eliminates high ranking official immunities in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon‘s Statute

The explicit powers granted to the STL through its statute to eliminate head of state immunities is another reflection of the overall authority
vested in the court when compared to other international tribunals. Prior to
the STL, all international jurisdictions, including, the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL,
the ECCC, and the ICC, included a provision in their statutes that explicitly
eliminated Head of State and high-ranking state official immunity protections of the accused.84 This provision is derived from the Statute of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg).85 Article 7 of the Nuremburg
Charter is known as the ―Nuremburg Principle‖ and states that ―[t]he official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility or mitigating punishment.‖86 The Nuremburg Principle
has since been restated in the 1946 Resolution of the General Assembly.87
The 1946 Resolution affirmed the principles of international law recognized
by both the entire charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and the Tribunal‘s
final judgments.88
The presence of the Nuremburg Provision in the charters of international U.N.-created tribunals enforces the idea that individual responsibility
should be required of accused high-ranking state officials before international tribunals. Individual responsibility is established by barring immunity

84
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827, art. 7, UN SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, UN Doc. S/Res/827/Annex (May 25,
1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192, 1194 (―The official position of any accused person,
whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not
relieve such person of criminal responsibility. . .‖); see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 79, art. 6; see also Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, supra note 51, art. 6. (The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2000)
is annexed to this Agreement, available at http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=u
Clnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=176); see also Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period
of Democratic Kampuchea art. 29; see also The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art. 27(July 17, 1998)[hereinafter The Rome Statute].
85
Aptel, supra note 7, at 1110–11.
86
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
87
ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 209 (Oxford University Press Inc., New York 2008).
88
Id.
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from both prosecution and punishment of high-ranking state officials.89 Article 6 of the statute for the STL states that amnesty will not be a reason to
bar prosecution for high-ranking officials; however, it mentions nothing
about completely excluding state official immunities.90 This may have been
done deliberately, with the intention of reserving the ability to eliminate
state official immunity protections for only traditional stricto senso international crimes.91 No traditional stricto senso crimes are being tried before the
STL, however. The crimes of terrorism being tried at the STL are arguably
so egregious that they should be considered stricto senso, and the issue will
be addressed in a later portion of this Note.92
Some commentators opine that the lack of a provision in the STL
statute explicitly eliminating state official immunities grants high-ranking
officials the immunities by default. However, the previous unfailing and
frequent presence of an immunity-eliminating clause in prior ad-hoc and
hybrid U.N.-created tribunals signifies a consensus in the international
community that all international tribunals should be afforded the ability to
eliminate immunities whether or not the tribunal is specifically afforded the
right. Reflecting this trend, the Rome Statute of the ICC also eliminated all
immunities for those individuals accused of all international crimes. Article
27(1) of the Rome Statute states:
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State
or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute.93

In addition, Article VII of the International Law Commission‘s
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind further
reflects the need for a universal elimination of high-ranking state official
immunities when international crimes are committed.94 It states that ―[t]he
official position of an individual who commits a crime against the peace and
89

Agreement for the Prosecution and of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 86, art. 7.
90
Aptel, supra note 7, at 1108–11.
91
See supra Part II (including in the list of stricto senso crimes, genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity).
92
Aptel, supra note 7, at 1111; see also infra Part III.C.6.e.
93
The Rome Statute, supra note 84, art. 27(1).
94
Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur in the International Criminal Court, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 1, 39–40 (2005)(explaining that although the Draft
Code is not binding authority in international law it is authoritative in defining international
customary law); see also Article 7 of the International Law Commission‘s (ILC‘s) Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996) [hereinafter ILC Draft
Code].

File: Ludwig 2

850

Created on: 5/16/2011 12:04:00 PM

Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:46:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L.

[Vol. 43

security of mankind, even if he acted as head of State or Government, does
not relieve him of criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.‖95
The above consensus indicates that customary international law96
now requires all individuals accused of committing the most heinous crimes
to face justice before an international tribunal, regardless of the individual‘s
official position.97 Appropriately, it was unnecessary for the drafters of the
STL statute to include an explicit provision that excluded head of state immunities.98 The lack of an explicit provision in the STL does not reduce the
authority vested to the tribunal by the international community to eliminate
all high-ranking state official immunity protections of the accused.
3.

The level of Security Council support for the creation of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon as exemplified through the Security Council
voting record

The level of support from the Security Council during the creation
of the STL is also reflective of the implicit authority vested to it by the international community.99 Five Security Council members abstained from
voting on the adoption of Resolution 1757.100 It may be contested that the
five abstentions reflect apprehensions that the Security Council is exceeding
its authority, and interfering into strictly domestic Lebanese issues by instituting the STL. Additionally, some may view the voting record as proof the
STL is not a legitimate international tribunal created from a Security Council resolution with complete support. Specifically, critics may point out that
in contrast to the STL, the ICTY is a truly legitimate tribunal, which was
established through Resolution 827 under Chapter VII of the U.N. charter
and by a unanimous vote in the Security Council.101 However, the Security

95

ILC Draft Code, supra note 94.
Customary international law norms are those principles which: (1) are broadly accepted
by the international community and (2) require the legal obligations of enforcement from all
nations. See Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head-of-State-Immunity: The
Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 176–77 (1986).
97
Mark A. Summers, Immunity of Impunity? The Potential Effect of Prosecutions of State
Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like the United States that are Not Parties
to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 31 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 463, 485–86 (2006)
(referring to the most heinous stricto senso crimes).
98
Alebeek, supra note 87, at 209.
99
The Security Council must vote to establish a tribunal under its Chapter VII powers. See
U.N. Charter, supra note 56, art. 39.
100
U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5685th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5685 (May 30, 2007).
101
United Nations Bibliographic Information System, S.C. Res. 827 (1993) on
establishment of the International Tribunal for Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (May 25, 1993) (stating that the United Nations voting record
96
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Council also created other ―legitimate‖ international tribunals under its
Chapter VII powers without achieving a unanimous Security Council vote.
For example, the Security Council passed Resolution 955 creating the
ICTR, even with one member voting against its creation and one abstaining.102 It is arguable that the ICTR Security Council vote of no support,
coupled with an abstention, is stronger evidence of the lack of Security
Council agreement for the tribunal, than the five abstentions present in the
creation of the STL.
Critics will also likely point out that in addition to the five votes of
abstention, the Security Council members, while voting, cautioned that the
implementation of the STL could have serious political repercussions.103
Despite these concerns, Resolution 1757 was pushed forward and legitimately passed through the process required to bring the international tribunal into force, just as the ICTY and ICTR before it experienced. This compliance with the process required for brining international tribunals into
force, coupled with a complete affirmative Security Council vote from those
members who did vote, enforces the claim that like the ICTY and the ICTR
before it, the United Nations views the STL as a legitimate Security Council
backed international tribunal.104 A further examination of the history behind
the STL‘s creation aids in better defining the scope of authority vested in
the STL.
4.

The evolution of the events leading up to the establishment of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon by the United Nations

The events leading up the establishment of the STL also contribute
to the conclusion that the STL was intended to be an ―international‖ tribunal
capable of eliminating state official immunity claims. First, in his letter to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Secretary- General), which
launched the process of creating the tribunal, the prime minster of Lebanon
referred to the STL as a ―tribunal of an international character.‖105 The Sewas Yes: 015, No: 000, Abstentions: 000, Non-Voting: 000, Total voting membership: 015),
available at http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=129C2Q9040Y97.6203&
menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=&index=.VW
&term=resolution&matchopt=0|0&oper=AND&x=18&y=3&aspect=power&index=.VW&te
rm=827+&matchopt=0|0&oper=AND&index=.AD&term=&matchopt=0|0&oper=AND&ind
ex=BIB&term=&matchopt=0|0&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&ultype=&uloper=%3D&
ullimit=&sort=.
102
3377 Meeting Record, Security Council, The Situation Concerning Rwanda, S/PV.3377
(May 16, 1994).
103
U.N. SCOR 62nd Sess., supra note 100.
104
Id.
105
See generally Charge d‘affaires a.i.of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the U.N.,
Letter Dated December13, 2005 from the Charge d‘affaires a.i.of the Permanent Mission of
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curity Council and the Secretary-General continued to refer to the STL as a
―tribunal of an international character‖ in a range of other official documents and reports.106 For example, in a Report of the Secretary General to
the Security Council, the Secretary-General specifically stated that a ―purely
national tribunal‖ could not effectively prosecute those accused of the
crimes in the STL‘s jurisdiction.107 However, in the report, the SecretaryGeneral also stressed that a purely ―international tribunal‖ would not assign
the level of responsibility to Lebanon that is required to achieve justice for
crimes that primarily affect the nation.108 The Secretary-General‘s report
designated the tribunal as a hybrid form of court, but did little to clarify the
scope of powers the STL—a court of ―international character‖— would
possess. A further examination of the history of the Resolution 1757 leading
to the court‘s creation aids in defining the court‘s designated authority.
After reviewing the first Secretary-General report, the Security
Council requested that the Secretary General negotiate with Lebanon for the
establishment of a tribunal of ―international character.‖109 The SecretaryGeneral acted accordingly and published a second report that included the
draft agreement between the United Nations and Lebanon for the STL.110 In
this document, the Secretary-General directly addressed the concept of developing a ―tribunal of international character.‖111 The Secretary-General
stated that although features of international character were not specifically
discussed in the statute for the STL,
The legal basis for the establishment of the special tribunal is an international agreement between the United Nations and a Member State; its
composition is mixed with a substantial international component; its standards of justice, including principles of due process of law, are those applicable in all international or United Nations-based criminal jurisdictions; its
rules of procedure and evidence are to be inspired, in part, by reference materials reflecting the highest standards of international criminal procedure;
and its success may rely considerably on the cooperation of third States.
Lebanon to the U.N. addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2005/783 (Dec. 13,
2005).
106
Id. (proposing Lebanon should have a UN backed court that is an ―international or internationally assisted‖ tribunal based on an agreement between the United Nations and Lebanon to try those individuals responsible for the Hairi assassination.).
107
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1644 (2005) U.N.
Doc. S/2006/176 (2006).
108
Id.
109
Schabas, supra note 23, at 515.
110
Id.
111
See generally Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal
for Lebanon U.N. Doc. S/2006/893 (2006) (first mentioned in para.2 but discussed throughout the document).
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While in all of these respects the special tribunal has international characteristics, its subject matter jurisdiction or the applicable law remains national
in character, however.112
This statement emphasized the several attributes of the STL that
mirror other international criminal tribunals. However, it also indicated that
the subject matter of the tribunal and the applicable substantive law are national in character.113
These combined events demonstrate the United Nation‘s belief that
the authority vested to the STL is similar to other international U.N.-created
tribunals. The following sections of this Note will evaluate how the STL‘s
limited subject matter jurisdiction and applicable Lebanese law affects its
ability to be considered ―international‖ enough to eliminate high-ranking
state official immunity claims. Specifically, the sections below will address
how the STL‘s ―international‖ characteristics outweigh the tribunals‘ ―national court‖ traits. Additionally, how the egregious nature of the crimes
being tried by the STL will aid in tipping the scales to allow the tribunal to
be considered ―international‖ enough to eliminate high-ranking state official
immunity claims.
C.

Characteristics of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

In addition to the ―international‖ level of authority vested in the
STL, the ―characteristics‖ of the court reflect that the STL is an ―international‖ tribunal capable of eliminating high-ranking official immunity
claims. The characteristics of a court include: (1) its title; (2) the composition of its judges and staff; (3) its sources of funding; (4) its location; (5) the
procedural methods used by the court; and (6) the courts subject matter jurisdiction.114 A comparison of the characteristics of the STL and other international U.N.-created tribunals must be completed to determine the level of
―international‖ traits the STL possesses.115
1.

Title of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The first characteristic used to evaluate if the STL is international
enough to eliminate high ranking state official immunities is the STL‘s title.
Since several U.N.-sponsored criminal tribunals use the word ―internation112

Id.
Schabas, supra note 23, at 516 (including in the subject matter terrorism, crimes and
offences against life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes
and offences and referring to the Lebanese Criminal Code as the substantive law used by the
court).
114
See generally INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 9-31(comparing
and contrasting the STL to other international ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals).
115
A visual comparison of the analysis in this section is available in Ann. 1.
113
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al‖ in their title, some may argue the lack of this term in the STL‘s title indicates it is not a truly international tribunal. Examples of U.N.-sponsored
courts with ―international‖ in their titles include the ICJ, the ICC, the ICTY,
and the ICTR.116
In Prosecutor v. Taylor, a similar argument was brought before the
Appeals Chamber of the SCSL, a U.N.-sponsored court which along with
the ECCC, does not use ―international‖ in its title.117 In its overall decision,
the Taylor Appeals Chamber attached little to no significance to distinctions
in the titles of the tribunals when it analyzed those attributes, which make a
tribunal ―international.‖118 The Taylor Court held that a ―Special Court‖ is
equivalent in status to other U.N.-backed tribunals, even those that have the
word ―international‖ in their title.119 Similarly, the STL uses the designation
of ―special‖ in its title and was created by the United Nations. The lack of
the term ―international‖ in the STL‘s title will not reduce the courts ability
to be considered ―international‖ enough to eliminate head of state immunities.
2.

Composition of the Judges Chambers Prosecutors, Registrar, and
Defense Office in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The second factor used to evaluate if the STL is a characteristically
―international‖ tribunal is the composition of its judges, prosecutors, registrar, and defense office. A comparison of the judicial composition of the
STL reveals that it is similar to other U.N.-created hybrid tribunals. The
STL statute requires its chambers to be composed of at least eleven independent judges and no more than fourteen judges in total.120 Additionally,
the judges in the STL Chambers must serve in the following capacities: (1)
a single international judge as the Pre-Trial Judge; (2) three judges in the
Trial Chamber, one who is Lebanese and two who are international; (3) in
the event of the creation of a second Trial Chamber, that Chamber must be
staffed in the same international to national ratio as the first defined Trial
Chamber; (4) five judges must serve in the Appeals Chamber, including two
Lebanese judges and three international judges; and (5) there must be two
116

See Schabas, supra note 23, at 514.
Id.; see also Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, supra note 64.
118
The court looked to several factors but did not mention that the name had any significance in distinguishing an ―international‖ court from one that was not ―international.‖ See
Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, supra note 64 (May 31, 2004); see also Schabas,
supra note 23, at 514.
119
Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, supra note 64, ¶ 42.
120
This ensures that at least three-quarters of the judges in the Chambers of the STL are
individuals from countries other than Lebanon. See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 8.
117
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alternate judges available at all times, one who is Lebanese and one who is
international.121
Some commentators argue that because the judicial staff (Chambers) of the STL is not entirely international, the STL is not a characteristically international tribunal. These individuals claim that the ICTY and the
ICTR ad-hoc tribunals are truly legitimate international courts, and that
every judge composing the Chambers in the ICTY and ICTR are international. However, the hybrid U.N.-created tribunals, the ECCC and SCSL,—
like the STL—do not have an entirely international Chambers. Yet these
tribunals are considered international enough to eliminate head of state immunities.122 In the SCSL Chambers, the majority of the judges are international, with the minority being from Sierra Leone.123 In the ECCC Chambers, the majority of the judges are national and the minority is international.124 It is noteworthy that like the SCSL, the majority of judges in both the
trial and appeals Chambers of the STL must be international. In addition,
the STL Chambers employ more ―international‖ judges than the ECCC, and
the STL‘s judicial composition mirrors the SCSL and ensures the STL is
characteristically ―international.‖
Further comparisons of the STL‘s Registry, Prosecutor, and Defense offices to other U.N.-created international tribunals reveal that the
STL is characteristically ―international‖ in these areas as well.125 There is no
requirement that the STL‘s head register be a Lebanese national, but instead
he must only be an international employee from the United Nations who is
appointed by the Secretary-General.126 This is consistent with the selection
methods of other U.N.-sponsored international tribunals, tribunals that must
meet the needs of the international community. Alternatively, if the STL
were a tribunal domestic in nature, a Lebanese registrar would be required
to meet solely national Lebanese needs.
A selection panel of individuals who were appointed by the Secretary-General chose the STL‘s Prosecutor.127 The ECCC was the first tribunal to use the method of choosing a prosecutor through a panel, and the STL
is the only tribunal to follow its example.128 Critics claim the selection of a
121

Id.
Johnson, supra note 5, at 275.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
See generally Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12 (defining,
throughout the different bodies of the tribunal and their functions).
126
Id. art. 4.
127
Id. art. 3.
128
The STL panel included international judges, a U.N. Legal Counsel and the former
president of the ICTR. INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 19.
122

File: Ludwig 2

856

Created on: 5/16/2011 12:04:00 PM

Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:46:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L.

[Vol. 43

prosecutor through a panel is not a transparent process.129 However, the use
of a selection panel is designed to ensure the selection of a more impartial
and professional tribunal staff occurs.130 Unlike the process of selecting the
Prosecutor, the task of choosing STL‘s Deputy-Prosecutor was assigned to
the Lebanese government.131 Commentators maintain that the presence of a
national deputy prosecutor is evidence that the STL is not an international
tribunal. Yet, a domestic deputy prosecutor was used in the ECCC and proposed for usage at the SCSL.132 The characteristics the STL‘s prosecutors
share with other legitimate international tribunals indicate that the STL‘s
prosecutor selection process and composition is similar to other international tribunals.
The Secretary-General, in consultation with the STL‘s President,
Judge Antonio Cassese, appoints the head of the STL defense office.133 This
selection process mirrors that used by other U.N. tribunals, however, the
STL is the first U.N. tribunal to include the Defense Office as a fourth ―organ‖ of the court.134 Under the STL statute, the STL defense office is afforded the same status as the Office of the Prosecutor, the Chambers, and
the Registry.135 Including the Defense Office as an organ of the court ensures defendants will be afforded more access to court finances and resources.136 Overall, the Defense Office is arguably more international in
nature than the defense offices of other U.N.- backed tribunals because the
office is included as an official organ of the court.
3.

Funding sources for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The funding scheme for the STL is the third characteristic that is
weighed when determining if the tribunal is characteristically ―international‖ enough to eliminate head of state immunity protections. Unlike the adhoc international tribunals, the STL is not funded by regular contributions to
the United Nations, and it will not be required to report to the U.N. General
Assembly.137 The ICTY and ICTR ad-hoc tribunals are subsidiary bodies of

129

Id.
Id.
131
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 3(3) (The Lebanese
Government must consult the Secretary-General and the Prosecutor in their selection process
for the deputy prosecutor).
132
INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 22.
133
See also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 13.
134
See INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 24.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
See also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 5.
130
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the U.N. Security Council and report directly to it.138 Accordingly, the same
budget processes used in other established U.N. program activities are used
to fund the ICTY and ICTR.139 Like other U.N. funded programs, every
expense recorded by the ICTY and ICTR is reviewed and reimbursed by the
member states of the United Nations collectively.140 Alternatively, the
STL‘s funding scheme is similar to the funding systems used by the SCSL
and the ECCC. The SCSL and the ECCC are funded by voluntary contributions of U.N. member states, and do not receive contributions from the general U.N. budget.141 Fifty-one percent of the STL‘s funding will be by voluntary contributions of U.N. member states, and forty-nine percent by the
Lebanese government. Additionally, if the required amount of voluntary
funding cannot be raised, the Security Council may explore other means of
financing the STL‘s work.142
Commentators claim that a tribunal, which receives forty-nine percent of its monies from the Lebanese government, may run into problems if
a change in power leads to the Lebanese government choosing to halt or
undermine a large portion of the STL‘s funding.143 Although a change in
power in the Lebanese government is a likely possibility, these criticisms
are ultimately unfounded. Both the SCSL and the ECCC have experienced
difficulties obtaining the required amount of funding to run the tribunals and
have prevailed through support from other financial avenues.144 Faced with
financial uncertainty, the SCSL previously requested and received funding
from the U.N. general fund to minimize delays in the court. 145 It is likely
that the U.N. Security Council included a provision in the STL statute that
allows the court to pursue alternate funding sources to allow for funding
from the U.N. general fund to be used to support the tribunal if a stalemate
occurs in the Lebanese government. The funding percentage set up may also
be in place to allow other interested U.N. member donors to contribute to
the STL‘s justice process if they become interested in the future.146 The STL
funding scheme is similar to hybrid tribunals, and requiring Lebanon to
138

Johnson, supra note 5, at 279.
Id.
140
Id. (A budgetary body in the General Assembly determines the exact percentage of the
tribunal‘s reimbursement each member state must contribute).
141
Id.
142
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 5 (describing the financing of the Tribunal).
143
AMNESTY INT‘L, THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON: SELECTIVE JUSTICE? 7 (2009),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE18/001/2009.
144
Johnson, supra note 5, at 280.
145
Id.
146
INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 15–16 (using similar reasoning
for new member participation in the Management Committee).
139
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contribute a set amount, while still allowing for flexibility in the funding
percentage from donors, will ensure the tribunal does not face the same financial difficulties that other voluntarily funded U.N. hybrid tribunals have
faced.
Critics also argue that the large contribution of funding to the STL
by the Lebanese government reduces the accountability and impartiality of
the court. Accordingly, Lebanese, not international, interests will largely
guide prosecutions and convictions before the STL. However, like the
SCSL, the STL has a Management Committee composed of major international donors that provides policy advice and direction for the non-legal
aspects of the court.147 This body ensures that the use of funding by the
court reflects the needs of the international community that created the tribunal.148 Current members of the STL Management Committee include the
United Kingdom (the Committee chair); Germany; the Netherlands; the
United States; France; and Lebanon.149 The Secretary-General also serves as
an ex-officio member of the Committee, adding an additional degree of
impartiality and international character to the STL.150
The STL Management Committee is required to report on a regular
basis to the ―Group of Interested States.‖151 The ―Group of Interested
States‖ is an assembly of nations who are interested in the happenings of the
STL, but may not necessarily support its work.152 Any U.N. member state
concerned with the financial influence of the STL‘s funding scheme may
join this group. The Management Committee may also expand its member
composition if any additional donors wish to participate and the donor
agrees to contribute a considerable amount of money to the tribunal.153 The
funding system for the STL is very similar to the voluntary donor systems
used by the ECCC and the SCSL, and although Lebanon is required to contribute forty-nine percent of the funding for the tribunal, the accountability
provided by the Management Committee will ensure that its funds are used
to achieve impartial international justice. Ensuring the funding factor of the
tribunal will remain more ―international‖ than national in character.

147

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 6; see also INT‘L CTR.
supra note 25, at 15–16.
148
INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 16.
149
Id. at 15.
150
Id. (stating that the Secretary-General does not vote on Management Committee Decisions, but adds his advice to decisions and aids in overseeing the process).
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 15.
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
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Location of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon‘s headquarters and
offices

The location of the STL headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands is
the fourth factor that indicates the tribunal is characteristically ―international‖ and able to eliminate high-ranking state official immunities. The principal judicial organs of the United Nations, the ICJ and the ICC, are all located in The Hague, Netherlands.154 The ICTY is also located in The Hague.155 The decision to place the ICTY in The Hague was influenced by the
placement of the aforementioned judicial organs and the inability to effectively run a court in a war torn nation.156 Like the ICTY, the ICTR was established soon after a war and its main office is located outside of the nation
where the crimes relevant to the tribunal occurred, in Arusha, Tanzania.
However, the ICTR still staffs a field office in Kigali, Rwanda, and its appeals chamber is located in The Hague.157 In contrast, the SCSL and the
ECCC are located completely within the borders of the concerned countries
with one exception.158 Even with an entirely domestically located court, the
SCSL has found it necessary to try high profile cases in The Hague in the
ICC‘s court room to ensure impartiality and safety of its participants.159
The STL‘s location most resembles the ICTR, with its headquarters
stationed outside of Lebanon in The Hague, Netherlands, and a field office
located in Beirut, Lebanon.160 Article 8 of the Security Council Resolution
for the STL states the tribunal shall specifically have its ―seat‖ outside of
Lebanon to insure ―fairness, security and administrative efficiency.‖161 The
tribunal consequently signed a ―headquarters agreement‖ with the Netherlands through the U.N. legal counsel to ensure the headquarters of the STL
remains in The Hague throughout its existence.162 Although the STL has
an office in Lebanon, the Security Council agreement to create the STL
states that the purpose of the Lebanon office is only to further investiga154

Johnson, supra note 5, at 278.
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 279 (noting that ―the trial of Charles Taylor in the Sierra Leone tribunal is being
held in The Hague, not in Freetown, the site of the tribunal‖).
159
Id. (Referring to the Charles Taylor case being held in The Hague, Netherlands.)
160
INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 12; see also Agreement between the United Nations and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning the Headquarters
of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Dec. 21, 2007, available at http://www.stltsl.org/sid/130 [hereinafter Headquarters Agreement].
161
See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12 (including upholding the
rights of witnesses and victims).
162
See generally Headquarters Agreement, supra note 160.
155
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tions.163 It is necessary for international tribunals to keep the trials of highranking officials with active supporters outside of the affected nation‘s borders for safety and security reasons. The need to conduct trials in a location
outside of a nation was addressed during the Charles Taylor‘s trial at the
SCSL.164 The decision to move Taylor‘s trial from Sierra Leone to The Hague occurred because the court was concerned that Taylor supporters in
Sierra Leone would use violent means to delay Taylor‘s trial, or enable to
the trial from occurring altogether.165 In addition to the Security Council
explicitly designating the Hague as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon‘s
―seat‖ for conducting trials166, potential tensions in Lebanon during the proceedings may disable the court from completing its assigned tasks, if trials
were be held inside Lebanese borders. Both of these factors suggest STL
trials will never be conducted in Lebanon. Accordingly, the location of the
court further lends to the STL‘s ―international‖ characteristics.
5.

Procedural methods used by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The fifth factor that makes the STL more international than domestic in nature are the STL‘s procedural methods. All of the U.N.-created tribunals listed in the visual comparison Annex section of this Note use procedural laws very similar to the STL. Each tribunal‘s procedural laws are
based on the international standards of justice and due process inspired by
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.167 Although the
STL is the first U.N.- backed international tribunal to apply only domestic
law, the procedural rules of the tribunal are required to replicate international standards of justice and due process.168 This factor weighs favorably in
the determination that the STL is an international tribunal capable of eliminating head of state immunities.
When comparing STL to other U.N.-created tribunals, it is evident
that the aforementioned five characteristics of the STL are very similar to
other U.N.-created tribunals before it. The traits of the STL, as discussed
above will not likely give rise to concerns that characteristically it is not an
international tribunal. However, the sixth characteristic, the subject matter
163

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 8, ¶ 3.
Johnson, supra note 5, at 275.
165
Id. (―While other trials conducted by the United Nations-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone, SCSL, have taken place in Freetown, the court is trying Taylor at the premises of
the International Criminal Court, ICC, in The Hague. The decision to locate the trial in The
Hague was taken in the interests of keeping the peace in Sierra Leone and the wider region.‖).
166
See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12 (including upholding the
rights of witnesses and victims).
167
Johnson, supra note 5, at 278.
168
Id.; see generally Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12.
164
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jurisdiction of the court, may become a seriously contested factor in determining if the STL is an international criminal tribunal capable of eliminating immunity claims of the accused.
6.

Subject matter jurisdiction for the Special Tribunal of Lebanon

The subject matter jurisdiction of a court is also evaluated to determine if the tribunal has the ability to prosecute crimes similar to other international tribunals, and is therefore intrinsically ―international.‖169 The STL
may be characteristically similar to a hybrid tribunal, however, the scope of
its subject matter jurisdiction is unlike any previous U.N.-created international tribunal.170 The STL‘s jurisdiction covers crimes defined only by a
domestic source, the Lebanese Penal Code (LPC).171 Additionally, the tribunal is trying no traditional ―international‖ crimes under the LPC. 172 Included in the jurisdiction of the STL are: acts of terrorism; crimes, and offenses against life and personal integrity; illicit associations; and failure to
report crimes and offenses defined under the LPC.173
Like the STL, SCSL and the ECCC have jurisdiction over domestic
crimes.174 However, in addition to their domestic subject matter jurisdiction,
the SCSL and the ECCC also have jurisdiction over international crimes.175
No international court decision has directly addressed the question of
whether a U.N.-created tribunal only prosecuting non-universally recognized ―international‖ crimes could be one that has the power to eliminate
claims of immunity.176 In the Arrest Warrant Case, the ICJ stated it is ―too
new to admit of any definite answer‖ on what exactly what constitutes an
―international court.‖177
169

Schabas, supra note 23, at 516–17.
Id. at 517.
171
Id. at 519; see also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 2.
172
Schabas, supra note 23, at 517.
173
See generally Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12.
174
Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
5 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 1125, 1126 (2007); see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 277–78 (the
SCSL does have subject matter jurisdiction over domestic crimes, but actual SCSL prosecutions focus on crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
and of Additional Protocol II, and other serious violations of international humanitarian Law.
The domestic subject-matter jurisdiction of the SCSL has played a very small role in the
court‘s trials).
175
See Johnson, supra note 5, at 278 (the ECCC and the SCSL are a part of the their nations domestic court system. In contrast, the STL is a judicial body independent from the
Lebanese legal system).
176
See Schabas, supra note 23, at 516 (referring to the reference by the court of ―certain
international criminal courts‖ capable of eliminating high-ranking state official immunities).
177
See Arrest Warrant, supra note 31 (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda, ¶ 14).
170
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The STL‘s lack of jurisdictional power over international crimes
may create problems for the STL‘s Office of the Prosecutor because highranking state official immunities have not historically been waived for individuals that commit domestic crimes.178 Critics claim that defining the STL
as an international tribunal impedes on the sovereign rights of nations because the STL subject matter jurisdiction is solely domestic. However,
Judge Christine van den Wyngaert‘s dissent in the Arrest Warrant Case
supports the concept that allowing characteristically hybrid tribunals like the
STL to exercise universal jurisdiction and eliminate state official immunities is valid.179 Van den Wyngaret stated that eliminating high-ranking state
official immunities is valid if doing so ensures ―the whole recent movement
in modern international criminal law towards recognition of the principle of
individual accountability for international crimes‖ is not ignored.180 This is
especially important for the STL, where the accused before the tribunal may
be current or former high-ranking state officials who may be afforded complete immunity if it is held the tribunal is inherently domestic and not ―international.‖ However, emerging trends in international law suggest that the
acts of terrorism being tried before the STL are international in nature. Accordingly the tribunal is ―international‖ enough to eliminate claims of highranking official immunities.
a.

Terrorism defined under the Lebanese Penal Code

The portions of the LPC included in the subject matter jurisdiction
of the STL are those ―relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of
terrorism, crimes and offences life and personal integrity, illicit associations
and failure to report crimes and offences, including the rules regarding the
material elements of a crime, criminal participation and conspiracy.‖181 The
portion of the LPC that defines terrorist acts explains that they are those
activities ―intended to create a state of panic committed by using such
means as explosives, inflammable materials, toxic or incendiary products,
and infectious and microbial agents that cause public danger.‖182 Hariri‘s
assassination was committed with explosives, and the attack will be consi178

See Summers, supra note 97, at 486–89.
See Schabas, supra note 23, at 516.
180
See Arrest Warrant, supra note 31 (dissenting opinion of Justice Van den Wyngaret, ¶
27) (although she notes a narrow approach is often taken in respect to immunity protections).
181
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 2; see also Jurdi, supra
note 174, at 1129 (specifically Articles 270, 271, 314, 335, 547, 548, and 549 of the LPC and
Articles 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the Law dated January 11, 1958).
182
Issam Michael Saliba, International Tribunals, National Crimes and the Hariri assassination: A Novel Development in International Criminal Law, THE LAW LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS 5 (2007) (citing Legislative Decree 340 of 1943 (Leb.), art. 314), available at
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/hariri/hariri.pdf.
179
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dered an act of terrorism under the LPC if it can be proven that the accused
intended to create a state of fear among the Lebanese public.183 Assuming
the Hariri assassination was an act of terrorism as defined by the LPC, the
STL will be considered international enough to eliminate head of state immunities if the assassination is classified as an international crime, either
independently or under the broader subset of crimes against humanity.
b.

Terrorism as an independent international crime defined by a treaty
or through customary international law

A crime may be defined as ―international‖ either because a treaty
labels it as such, or because it is universally accepted as ―international‖
through customary international law.184 As previously mentioned in the ―A
Historical Development of International Criminal Tribunals‖ Part II.A of
this Note there are currently three widely recognized ―international‖ or
stricto senso international crimes: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.185 The crimes being tried before the STL include: terrorist acts,
crimes of illicit association, and offenses against life and personal integrity.
Such crimes are generally not considered part of the historic list of stricto
senso crimes.186 However, an international trend is emerging that suggests
terrorism should also be included on the list of stricto senso crimes. This
coupled with a recent STL appeals chamber decision suggests that crimes of
terrorism will be ―international‖ crimes before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.187
c.

Terrorism - an international crime as defined by treaties

In addition to the universal jurisdiction granted to stricto senso
crimes, treaties authorize universal jurisdiction over further offenses.
Crimes that are granted universal jurisdiction by treaties include: torture,
hostage apprehension, and hijacking transgressions.188 The grant of universal jurisdiction by treaties indicates that perpetrators of treaty-defined
crimes are ―enemies of mankind‖ and are condemned by the international
183

Id. (for a further discussion of how the Hariri attack created a state of fear among the
Lebanese Population See infra Part III.C.6.e).
184
Schabas, supra note 23, at 517.
185
Aptel, supra note 7, at 1111; See supra Part II.A.
186
Id. (as defined by the Lebanese criminal code).
187
Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I (Feb. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.stl-tsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/CaseFiles/chambers/20110216_STL-1101_R176bis_F0010_AC_Interlocutory_Decision_Filed_EN.pdf [hereinafter Interlocutory
Decision].
188
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 2134.
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community.189 In addition to the crimes of torture, hostage apprehension,
and hijacking defined by treaties, several conventions and treaties exist that
grant nations jurisdiction for crimes of terrorism.
International support through treaties for combating acts of terrorism began in 1926 when the International Congress of Penal Law recommended a Permanent Court of International Justice should be granted the
power to ―judge individual liabilities‖ that occur as a result of international
offenses which are ―a threat to world peace.‖190 Although this idea died, and
there currently is no universally recognized definition for terrorism,191 similar requests to include certain acts of terrorism as international crimes have
been expressed in the international forum.192
One example occurred in 1994, when the U.N. General Assembly
passed a Resolution named ―Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.‖193 This Resolution provided a general definition of terrorism and
stated:
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes
are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.194

In the preface to this Resolution, the U.N Secretary General, Kofi
Annan, emphasized how important it is for the international community to

189

Id. at 2133–34.
SCHARF & NEWTON, supra note 10 (citing Voeau of the International Congress of Penal
Law Concerning an International Criminal Court (Brussels, 1926), reprinted in Historical
Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Memorandum Submitted by
the Secretary-General 74, UN Doc. A/CN.4/7Rev.1 (1949) (translating the original French
text found in Premier congres international de droit penal, Actes du congres 634)).
191
Kevin J. Greene, Terrorism as Impermissible Political Violence: An International Law
Framework, 16 VT. L. REV. 461, 462 (l992) (―Terrorism has ‗no precise or widely accepted
definition.‘‖).
192
Id. (These requests have occurred on several occasions. One suggestion came from the
French government to the League of Nations that the ICC would be the best forum for trying
political crimes of an international nature, and an international convention on the suppression
of terrorism should be created to initiate the process. In 1937, a Conference for the Repression of Terrorism met and collaborated to adopt a Convention of an International Criminal
Court to address terrorist acts. Although this treaty was rejected the idea before it was ratified, every multilateral anti-terrorism convention adopted since has adhered to the pattern
used by the Conference and has defined specific terrorist acts as violations of international
law.).
193
SCHARF & NEWTON, supra note 10.
194
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, (Dec. 9 1994), para. I.3
[hereinafter Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism].
190

File: Ludwig 2

2011]

Created on: 5/16/2011 12:04:00 PM

Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:46:00 PM

TIPPING THE SCALE

865

try acts of terrorism.195 Additionally, it appears from the ―Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism‖ Resolution that the U.N. General Assembly
believes that to properly combat terrorist acts, universal jurisdiction must be
provided over terrorist criminals regardless of their position.196 The Security
Council again deplored acts of terrorism in Resolution 1373 on the international cooperation to combat threats to international peace and security
caused by terrorist acts. The resolution condemns international acts of terrorism and reinforces the idea that acts of terrorism constitute a threat to
―international peace and security.‖197
Currently, several multilateral anti-terrorism conventions exist that
focus on the domestic enforcement of terrorism through international cooperation.198 Additionally, acts of transnational terrorism, like the Hariri assassination, are becoming a serious problem.199 Accordingly, defining terrorism as an international crime in an effort to bring offenders to justice is now
a priority in nations across the globe.200 However, none of the mentioned
conventions specifically refer to terrorism as an international criminal offense.201 Although terrorism is not explicitly defined as an international
crime through treaties, the international condemnation of terrorist crimes
described above suggests a trend in customary international law is emerging
that defines certain egregious acts of terrorism as international crimes.
d.

Terrorism as defined through customary international law

As previously mentioned, principles that are considered customary
international law are those which are broadly accepted by the international
community, and require the legal obligations of enforcement from all nations.202 Combating grave crimes through customary international law reflects the international community‘s interest in protecting higher norms of
justice when these norms come into conflict with the rules of state official
195

Id. at Preface.
Id. at I.1-2 (stating ―the methods and practices of terrorism [are] criminal and unjustifiable-whoever commits them and wherever they occur.‖)
197
See U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 438th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (conferring about states‘ obligations to combat terrorism).
198
Greene, supra note 191, at 467–71 (included but not limited to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, and the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.).
199
SCHARF & NEWTON, supra note 10.
200
Id.
201
Saliba, supra note 182, at 5.
202
See Mallory, supra note 96, at 176–77.
196
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immunity.203 Part III.C.6.c of this Note provided several examples of when
the international community accepted the need to combat terrorism. 204 In
addition, the U.N. General Assembly stated ―any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed and are unequivocally condemned.‖205 There were also
proposals to include terrorist crimes in the ICC statute.206 Currently, the
Security Council requires member nations of the United Nations to ―accept
and carry out‖ resolutions that combat ―terrorism,‖ but have yet to define
what those terms mean.207
A few national courts have also recently expressed support for an
exception to state official immunity protections when crimes are so egregious that not prosecuting the individuals allegedly responsible would violate widely understood norms of justice.208 These domestic court cases
lend support to the ability to define terrorism as a stricto senso international
crime. Included in these national cases is a case from the United States, Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, the United States 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals held that international law does not recognize an act of
torture as a sovereign act with immunity protections.209 However, critics
may point to the Qaddafi case210 and claim that unlike the torture in the Siderman case, the Hariri attack, which took the lives of 22 individuals by car
bomb, is not extreme enough to be defined as ―international.‖
In the Qaddafi case, the leader of Liberia, Muammar Qaddafi (Qaddafi), was sued in France for his government‘s participation in a terrorist

203

See generally Arrest Warrant, supra note 32.
See supra Part III.C.6.c.
205
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, supra note 194.
206
Schabas, supra note 23, at 520.
207
SCHARF & NEWTON, supra note 10.
208
See Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens
and its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 97, 106 (2004)
(including other cases where sovereign immunity has been dissolved for especially heinous
crimes. In Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, a Greek court upheld a
compensation claim against Germany for the massacre of 218 civilians and the destruction of
their property by members of the S.S. in June 1944); see also Pasquale De Sena & Francesca
De Vittor, State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court Decision on the
Ferrini Case, 16 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 89 (2005) (where an Italian court in Ferrini v. Federal
Republic of Germany upheld an Italian citizen‘s claim against German government officials
for an incident where he was captured by German troops in the province of Arezzo and deported to Germany where he was forced to work for the war industry, considering this a war
crime).
209
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of n11/dc10.htm.Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (1992).
210
See generally Gaddafi Case, Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Mar. 13, 2001, 125 I.L.R. 490 (Fr.).
204
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bombing.211 The attack, which was claimed to be lead by the Liberian Government, resulted in the crash of a French UTA aircraft over Africa, and the
loss of the 171 lives.212 The court held that no matter how severe Qaddafi‘s
terrorist charge was, the act did not fall into one of the exceptions to immunity claims for current foreign Heads of State.213 However, the court in
its decision failed to give any explanation to why terrorism is not an international crime.214 The lack of reasoning behind the court‘s decision reduces
the weight of this case when used to determine if universal jurisdiction
should be provided to try egregious acts of terrorism. Apart from of the
Qaddafi case, a general trend towards expanding the traditional list of stricto senso crimes to include additional grave offenses such as torture and particularly abhorrent acts of terrorism is emerging in national courts.
The obiter dictum of a recent unanimous Interlocutory Decision by
the STL‘s Appellate Chamber supports the trend of categorizing terrorism
as a stricto senso crime, and suggests that the Hariri assassination may be
considered an ―international‖ act of terrorism before the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, removing any immunity protections it‘s perpetrators would
have otherwise been afforded.215 The STL Statute dictates that the STL
Chambers shall define crimes of terrorism using domestic Lebanese law.216
However, the STL Appeals Chamber in the February 2011 Interlocutory
Decision stated that the STL Justices may read the Lebanese law contained
in the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunal in the context of ―international obligations undertaken by Lebanon with which, in the absence of
very clear language, it is presumed any legislation complies.‖217
In the decision, the STL court also stated that although some critics
claim otherwise, terrorism is a crime defined under international law, and
this is reflected in the current widely accepted customary definition of terrorism, which is drawn from state practice and opino juris.218 The STL In211

Salvatore Zappalà, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for
International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 EUR. J.
INT‘L L. 595, 595–96 (2001) (specifically charged with murder for complicity in a terrorist
act); see also id.
212
Id.; see also Gaddafi Case, supra note 210.
213
Id. at 596; see also Gaddafi Case, supra note 210.
214
Id. at 598; see also Gaddafi Case, supra note 210.
215
Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187.
216
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 1.
217
Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶¶ 19–20; see also Michael Scharf, Special
Tribunal for Lebanon Issues Landmark Ruling on Definition of Terrorism and Modes of
Participation, 15 ASIL Insights (March 4, 2011), http://www.asil.org/insights110304.cfm#
_ednref5 (last visited Apr. 17, 2011).
218
See Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶¶ 83, 102 (stating that, ―although it is held
by many scholars and other legal experts that no widely accepted definition of terrorism has
evolved in the world society because of the marked difference of views on some issues,
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terlocutory Decision marks the first time that an international tribunal distinctly established a universal definition of terrorism under international
law,219 and the Decision set out three elements in this new ―customary law‖
definition of terrorism:
(i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostagetaking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act; (ii) the intent to
spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) when
the act involves a transnational element.220

When applying the facts of the Hariri assassination to the customary
international law definition of terrorism provided in the Interlocutory Decision, it appears that the car bombing that took the life of Rafiq Hariri and 22
others satisfies the first element of the definition, which requires the ―perpetration of a criminal act‖.221 Additionally, that the first option of the second
element of the definition, requiring the intent of the perpetrators to be the
creation fear among the population, will likely be satisfied. Specifically,
because the car bomb resulted in the death of 22 individuals in addition to
Hariri, and this causality toll could possibly be considered the creation of a
―public danger.‖222 The court held that the means of attack used in crimes
being tried before the STL need not be evaluated when deciding if an attack
is considered terrorism or murder under the STL‘s jurisdiction.223 This will
provide the court expansive discretion when determining if crimes under the
STL‘s jurisdiction meet the first option of the second element. Specifically,
because the holding now allows those crimes committed using rifles or
handguns which that at first glance appear do not cause a danger to the general population, to meet the first option of the second element. Something
that is contrary to domestic Lebanese case law defining terrorism.224
Alternatively, the second option of the second element may be satisfied under this definition if the perpetrators intended to use the attack to
closer scrutiny reveals that in fact such a definition has gradually emerged.‖); see also
Scharf, supra note 217.
219
Scharf, supra note 217.
220
Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶ 85.
221
Id.
222
See id. (stating that the first option of the second element would generally entail the
creation of a public danger); see also generally, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
supra note 12 (describing how the Hariri Assassination took the life of Rafiq Hariri and 22
others).
223
Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶ 147; see also Scharf, supra note 217.
224
Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶¶ 59, 138, 145; see also Scharf, supra note
217.
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directly or indirectly coerce the Lebanese Government to take some form of
action.225 The actual intent of the perpetrators as required in both options of
element two ultimately would only be determined when evidence is produced at trial. Finally, the third element of the ―international‖ terrorism definition expressed by the Interlocutory Decision requires that the Hariri assassination involved a transnational element.226 The ability of the Hariri
attack to meet this element, like the second element if the definition, is
something that will only be determined after the production of evidence at
trial.
Additionally, although it appears that the STL Appellate Chamber
through the Interlocutory Decision confirmed a general definition of terrorism under international law,227 the extent that the Chamber will read the
Lebanese Law in the context of the customary international law definition
of terrorism for the Hariri attack, will only be determined by subsequent
STL jurisprudence.228
Even if the Hariri act of terrorism does not fall into the customary
international law definition of terrorism created by the STL Chambers in the
Interlocutory Decision, some acts of terrorism may also be considered international crimes against humanity. This categorization occurs because the
acts of terrorism are intrinsically grave and have particularly odious consequences on the lives and assets of innocent civilians.
e.

The Hariri assassination: Can terrorism be considered a crime
against humanity?

While the STL does not explicitly include crimes against humanity
in its subject matter jurisdiction, certain egregious acts of terrorism, like the
Hariri assassination, can be categorized as a crime against humanity under
the category of ―other inhumane acts‖ and should be considered stricto senso international crimes that are not afforded immunity protections.229 In
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, the ICTY held that ―the prohibition against
terror is a specific prohibition within the general prohibition of attack on
civilians. [The latter of which constitutes a] peremptory norm of customary
international law.‖230 This holding supports the idea that singular acts of
225

Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶¶ 59, 138, 145; see also Scharf, supra note

217.
226

Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶ 85.
Scharf, supra note 217.
228
Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶¶ 19–20.
229
See generally Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12 (the term
―Crimes Against Humanity‖ is never explicitly used); see also SCHARF & NEWTON, supra
note 10.
230
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 98 (Int‘l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://www.icty.org/x/
227
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terrorism which are a part of a greater widespread systematic attack on a
civilian population may be considered crimes against humanity.
In order for the Hariri assassination to be considered a crime against
humanity, it must have been part of a greater set of criminal acts that when
taken together equate to (1) a ―widespread or systematic‖ attack that is (2)
―directed against [a] civilian population.‖231 The established international
jurisprudence considers a ―widespread attack‖ as one directed against a
multiplicity of victims. In contrast, the term ―systematic attack‖ has a higher
threshold and for acts to fall under the definition of a ―systematic attack,‖
the crimes must be orchestrated by virtue of a preconceived plan or policy.232 The policy does not have to be adopted formally as the policy of a
state, but there must exist some kind of preconceived plan or policy for terror or violence at a high level of state politics.233
It is not clear whether the Hariri assassination was part of a larger
widespread ―systematic attack.‖ In any case, this attack could only be qualified as such if it is proven that it was directed against the Lebanese people
as part of a larger political policy of repression and fear.

cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf.
231
Id. ¶¶ 40–48; see also Rome Statue, supra note 84 (listing the following as crimes
against humanity and proffering internationally accepted definitions of key terms within the
specified offenses: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of
population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health); see
also Agreement for the Prosecution and of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 86 (defining ―crimes against
humanity‖ as ―murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated‖).
232
Vincent-Joël Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in
the Post-September 11th Era: Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity,
19 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 1009, 1071–72 (2004) (the Akayesu decision defined the concept of
―widespread,‖ stating that it is ―massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively
with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims.‖ The court stated
that a systematic crime ―is thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on the basis
of a common policy involving substantial public or private resources‖).
233
Id. at 273–74 (noting that even classified terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda could be held
responsible for crimes against humanity).
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A set of factors can be used to determine if the Hariri assassination
truly was ―systematic in nature.‖ The factors established by international
jurisprudence include: (1) The existence of a underlying policy of terror that
targets a specific community as defined by the scale or the repeated, unchanging, and continuous nature of violence committed against a particular
civilian population; (2) the creation of specific institutions to implement the
policy of terror; (3) an extensive level of involvement of high-level political
or military authorities in the underlying plan and the specific attack; and (4)
the employment of considerable financial, military, or other resources to
implement the policy and attack.234
Individuals responsible for the Hariri attack may argue that the
bombing was not part of a systematic attack on the civilian population of
Lebanon, but was, for example, an isolated political event. They may also
additionally argue that the ICTY—a truly international tribunal—requires
that crimes against humanity must take place in ―armed conflict.‖235 However, the U.N. Secretary General states in his report on the ICTY statute that
crimes against humanity are ―prohibited regardless of whether they are
committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in character.‖236
This statement supports the idea that no matter the surrounding circumstance, acts that meet a certain level of atrocity should be considered crimes
against humanity. The report also observes that inhumane acts have to be
―committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds,‖237
countering any argument that a political attack cannot be considered a crime
against humanity.
The ICTY supported the ideas expressed in the U.N. Secretary
General‘s report in the Galic holding. In Galic, the ICTY held that an attack
that is expressly intended to provoke terror in the civilian population or the
234

Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 53 (Dec. 14 1999). The
ICTY defined four factors used to determine the systematic character of an attack: (1) the
existence of a political objective; (2) a plan pursuant to which the attack is perpetrated or an
ideology behind the attack to destroy, persecute or weaken a community; (3) the undertaking
of a criminal act on a very large scale against a group of civilians or the repeated and continuous commission of inhumane acts linked to one another; (4) the preparation and use of
significant public or private resources, whether military or other; the implication of highlevel political and/or military authorities in the definition and establishment of the methodical plan.
235
Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note
84, at 5 (enumerating the crimes of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds, and other
inhumane acts for which the Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute).
236
U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
237
Id. ¶ 48.
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political structure of a nation does not comport with the laws and customs of
war, and is a crime against humanity.238 The ICTR likewise echoed this
sentiment in the Akayesu. In Akayesu, the ICTR stated that acts of violence
intended to create terror in the civilian population are crimes against humanity and do not require special intent.239 Specifically, these types of acts ―are
prohibited regardless of whether they are committed in an armed conflict,
international or internal in character.‖240 The violent car bomb attack that
took the life of the Lebanese public figure former Prime Minister Hariri,
may be considered part of a greater scheme of attacks that were meant to
provoke terror both in the Lebanese civilian population and in the Lebanese
political scheme. 241 In addition, several Lebanese journalists who are public
figures in the nation, amongst other victims of targeted and non-targeted
attacks that occurred in Lebanon, have been maimed or murdered in attacks.242 According to certain sources, these journalists were known for
supporting Lebanese independence through their journalistic mediums.243
The resulting feelings from these attacks may also have contributed to creating widespread fear and self-censorship among journalists and Lebanese
citizens.244 Former Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora expressed to
global news outlets that ―there is no doubt‖ that the attacks on the journalists and others are related in some manner to the Hariri assassination.245
Although crimes against humanity are not an explicit charge provided for in the STL statute, it appears that the Hariri terrorist attack may
possess several of the characteristics required for this form of international
crime. The underlying possible policy of terror orchestrated by an undetermined group, the potential amount of resources exerted to commit the attacks leading up to Hariri‘s attack, and Hariri‘s assassination itself, may
238

Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶¶139–42
(Dec. 5 2003).
239
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 565, 568 (Sept.
28, 1998).
240
Id.
241
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, supra note 239, ¶ 565; Statute of the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon, supra note 12.
242
Ann Cooper Committee to Protect Journalists, CPJ Urges UN to Expand Lebanon Inquiry to Include Journalist Attacks, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Oct. 11, 2005),
available at http://cpj.org/2005/10/cpj-urges-un-to-expand-lebanon-inquiry-to-include.php
(presenting the attacks against Samir Qassir who, on June 2, 2005 was killed in a car bombing outside of his home in Beirut and May Chidiac who, on Sept. 25, lost her leg and arm in
a car bombing near the city of Jouneih, Lebanon).
243
Id. (presenting the fact that bombing victim, Samir Qassir, had highlighted President alAssad‘s inability to bring about real political reform in his writings and accordingly supported Lebanese independence).
244
Id.
245
Id.
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fulfill the threshold for the first and second factors required for the assassination to be considered a crime against humanity. Only factual evidence
brought before the court at the STL will determine if these factors, and in
particular factor three, an extensive level of involvement of high-level political or military authorities from any country in the underlying plan and the
specific attack, in fact is met, should a crime against humanity be charged.
The possibility that the Hariri assassination and other associated attacks
being tried by the STL are crimes against humanity would allow for the
STL Chambers to rule that the assassination was an international crime of
terrorism. Allowing for the STL to eliminate claims of high-ranking state
official immunities, if necessary.
IV. CONCLUSION
The STL should be considered ―international‖ enough to eliminate
high-ranking state official immunities. The tribunal has a parallel level of
authority vested to it, and is characteristically very similar to international
U.N.-created hybrid tribunals. Although terrorism is not a universally recognized ―international‖ crime to date, and has never been the sole international criminal subject matter jurisdiction of a U.N.-sponsored tribunal, the
STL is a groundbreaking international criminal court. Considering the circumstances surrounding the Hariri assassination and the recent developments in international law, it is likely that this institution will pave the way
in creating an international definition for crimes of terrorism. This will allow for the prosecution of perpetrators of acts of terrorism equally egregious
as the Hariri assassination and surrounding attacks to be prosecuted, regardless of the official rank the perpetrators hold. Allowing U.N.-created tribunals to eliminate immunities for high-ranking state officials that commit extreme crimes of terrorism will ensure other global leaders are deterred from
committing heinous crimes against innocent people in the future, further
instilling the overall goals of justice underlying international law.
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APPENDIX 1 – INTERNATIONAL U.N.-CREATED TRIBUNALS: A
COMPARISON CHART

STL (2007)
Agreement
Mode of
Establishment between
Lebanon and
Security
Council not
Ratified in
Lebanon,
Security
Council uses
Chapter VII
Powers to
Impose
agreement
No
Provision
Eliminating
High
Ranking
Official
Immunities
in Charter
10 Approve, 5
Security
Abstain
Council
Voting
Record
―Special‖
Title and
Tribunal for
Description
Lebanon
Judicial
Composition

Funding

Majority
International,
Minority
National
Voluntary
Contributions:
49% Lebanon

ICTY (1993)
Imposed by
Security
Council under
Chapter VII
Powers
Resolution
827

ICTR (1994)
Imposed by
Security
Council under
Chapter VII
Powers
Resolution
955

SCSL (2002)
Bilateral
Agreement/Treaty
between the
Security Council
and Sierra Leone,
endorsed by
Security Council
Resolution.

ECCC (2003)
Bilateral
Agreement/Treaty
between the
General
Assembly and
Cambodia,
endorsed by
Security Council
Resolution

ICC (2002)
Multilateral
Treaty, No
Parties –
―Rome Statute
of the
International
Criminal
Court‖

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

15 Approve

13 Approve, 1
Abstains, 1
Disapproves

N/A

N/A

N/A

―International‖
Criminal
Tribunal for
Yugoslavia
All
International

―International‖
Criminal
Tribunal for
Rwanda
All
International

―Special‖ Court
for Sierra Leone

―International‖
Criminal
Court

Contributions
by All Member

Contributions
by all Member
States of the

Voluntary
Contributions of
UN Member

―Extraordinary‖
Chambers in the
Courts of
Cambodia
Majority
National,
Minority
International
Voluntary
Contributions of
UN Member

Majority
International,
Minority National

All
International

Contributions
by All Member
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2011]
& 51% Other
States

Location

Procedural
Methods of
the Court

Subject
Matter
Jurisdiction

Headquarters:
The Hague,
Netherlands
Field Office:
Beirut,
Lebanon
International
Covenant on
Civil and
Political
Rights
Lebanese
Penal Code:
Terrorist
Attacks and
Assassinations
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TIPPING THE SCALE
States of the
UN as decided
by budgetary
bodies of the
General
Assembly
The Hague,
Netherlands

International
Covenant on
Civil and
Political
Rights
War crimes,
Genocide, and
Crimes
Against
Humanity

875

UN as decided
by budgetary
bodies of the
General
Assembly

States

States

Headquarters:
Arusha,
Tanzania
Field Office:
Kigali, Rwanda
International
Covenant on
Civil and
Political
Rights
War crimes,
Genocide, and
Crimes
Against
Humanity

Freetown, Sierra
Leone
Exception:
Charles Taylor
Trial: The Hague,
Netherlands
International
Covenant on
Civil and
Political Rights

Phnom Penh,
Cambodia

International
Covenant on
Civil and
Political Rights

War Crimes,
Genocide, Crimes
Against
Humanity and
Domestically
Defined Crimes
(linked to the
domestic judicial
system)
Special Tribunal for Lebanon,246 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 247 International Criminal Court for Rwanda,248 Special Court for

246

War crimes,
Crimes Against
Humanity and
Domestic Crimes
(independent not
linked to the
domestic judicial
system)

See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1757; see also U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5685th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5685 (May 30,
2007); see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 275–79 (2008); see also Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 1125,
1126 (2007).
247
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827, art. 7, UN SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, UN Doc. S/Res/827/Annex (May 25,
1993); see also United Nations Bibliographic Information System, S.C. Res. 827 (1993) on
establishment of the International Tribunal for Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (May 25, 1993) (stating that the United Nations voting record
was Yes: 015, No: 000, Abstentions: 000, Non-Voting: 000, Total voting membership: 015),
available at http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=129C2Q9040Y97.6203&
menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=&index=.VW
&term=resolution&matchopt=0|0&oper=AND&x=18&y=3&aspect=power&index=.VW&te
rm=827+&matchopt=0|0&oper=AND&index=.AD&term=&matchopt=0|0&oper=AND&ind
ex=BIB&term=&matchopt=0|0&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&ultype=&uloper=%3D&
ullimit=&sort=‘; see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 275–79 (2008).

States of the
UN as decided
by budgetary
bodies of the
General
Assembly
The Hague,
Netherlands

International
Covenant on
Civil and
Political
Rights
War Crimes,
Genocide,
Crimes
Against
Humanity, and
Crimes of
Aggression
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Sierra Leone,249 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,250 and International Criminal Court.251

248

See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda para. 2, S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); see also 3377 Meeting Record, Security Council, The
Situation Concerning Rwanda, S/PV.3377 (May 16, 1994); see also Larry D. Johnson, Lecture, UN-Based International Criminal Tribunals: How They Mix and Match, 36 DENV. J.
INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 275-79 (2008).
249
See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (Jan. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CLk1rMQtCHg%3D&tabid=176; see also
Larry D. Johnson, Lecture, UN-Based International Criminal Tribunals: How They Mix and
Match, 36 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 275-79 (2008); see also Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The SubjectMatter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 1125, 1126
(2007).
250
See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period
of Democratic Kampuchea (June, 6 2003), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/
agreement_image.aspx; see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 275–79 (2008); see also Nidal
Nabil Jurdi, The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT‘L
CRIM. JUST. 1125, 1126 (2007).
251
See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9,
art. 27(July 17, 1998); see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 275–79.

